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The biological substrate for cognition remains a challenge as much as defining this function of 
living beings. Here, we examine some of the difficulties to understand normal and disordered 
cognition in humans. We use aspects of Alzheimer’s disease and related disorders to illustrate 
how the wealth of information at many conceptually separate, even intellectually decoupled, 
physical scales – in particular at the Molecular Neuroscience versus Systems Neuroscience/
Neuropsychology levels – presents a challenge in terms of true interdisciplinary integration 
towards a coherent understanding. These unresolved dilemmas include critically the as yet 
untested quantum brain hypothesis, and the embryonic attempts to develop and define the 
so-called connectome in humans and in non-human models of disease. To mitigate these 
challenges, we propose a scheme incorporating the vast array of scales of the space and time 
(space–time) manifold from at least the subatomic through cognitive-behavioral dimensions 
of inquiry, to achieve a new understanding of both normal and disordered cognition, that is 
essential for a new era of progress in the Generative Sciences and its application to translational 
efforts for disease prevention and treatment.
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or “mindless” agents interact to achieve intelligent (cognitive) 
outcomes such as forming concepts, which could hypothetically 
be implemented (artificially) and occurs also without the indis-
pensable intervention of intention-endowed external agents, both 
in biological and (theoretically) in inert systems (Minsky, 1985). 
Other formulations much less grounded in “classical” physics or 
materialistic philosophy allege that components of such systems 
are “proto conscious” and that somehow their aggregate function-
ing can lead to more elaborate and complex states of conscious-
ness (Vimal, 2008).
One of the central problems to a true understanding of cognition 
is: precisely how do assemblies of components such as electronic 
elements, molecules (e.g., neurotransmitters and neuromodula-
tors), parts of the signaling machinery of neurons (e.g., synapses) 
and possibly also non-neuronal components of the neural tissue, 
neuronal assemblies – and even selected parts of the brain –   mediate 
such a complex and mysterious product as cognition? The now 
“traditional” – and as yet unsurpassed – answer is to adduce the 
principle of Emergence, which in Philosophy and Systems Theory is 
the tenet that a multiplicity of relatively simple interactions among 
components in Complex Systems results in “emergent properties.” 
This has been suggested to be the case in Nervous Systems, and, 
hypothetically also, for future artificial information-processing sys-
tems (e.g., Artificial Intelligence), in which the interactions of their 
parts somehow (e.g., “emergence”) results in a variety of products 
such as cognition. The general idea is not new, since it appears 
in the works of Aristotle (“…the whole is greater than the sum 
of the parts…”), Mill (1843) (“…The chemical combination of 
IntroductIon
The term “cognition” is notorious among many in the Generative 
Sciences for the elusive and unresolved definitional difficulties. 
Cognition is used in the scientific context to address “the process 
of thought,” or “the mental processes involved in gaining knowl-
edge and comprehension” (Anonymous, 2009). It can also refer 
to different aspects of such processes among different fields of 
study. For example, in some areas of Psychology and the Cognitive 
Sciences it most commonly refers to an information-processing 
view of psychological functions – without necessarily paying atten-
tion to the neural mechanisms involved. In Clinical Neurology 
this term often denotes a patient’s ability to carry out relatively 
short-term and somewhat basic tasks, such as memorizing simple 
data sets, and carrying out relatively simple visuospatial tasks 
and calculations. In this latter context, one of the critical aims is 
to identify as precisely as possible the regions of the brain that 
mediate the task in question. The main purpose being to ascertain 
and treat a variety of causes that can interfere with the proper 
functioning of those regions, both in isolation as well as together 
with other regions affected by disease. Other relevant formula-
tions, such as the “Society of Mind,” postulate that non-intelligent 
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In  the  present  formulation,  for  simplicity  on  a  topic  that 
is   notably bereft of such property, we address mainly cognitive 
processes that are conceivably mediated by interactions among 
molecules in the Nervous System and among neural cells (both 
neuronal and non-neuronal). In that sense, we restrict the poten-
tially considerably broad meaning of the term “cognitive”, with full 
awareness that this may be an oversimplification when considering 
Maturana and Varela’s Santiago Theory of Cognition, which holds 
that “Living systems are cognitive systems, and living as a process 
is a process of cognition. This statement is valid for all organisms, 
with or without a nervous system” (Capra, 1997).
A broAd ArrAy of tIme scAles relevAnt to the 
Assembly of the bIologIcAl “mAchInery” for 
cognItIon And Its dIsAssembly In dIseAse
Figure 1 depicts only a part of the spatial and temporal scales relevant 
to the understanding of cognitive phenomena, as well as the approxi-
mate portions of those scales that may be approachable by existing 
empirical methods. Most students of neurodegenerative conditions 
are familiar with the phenomena of action potential transmission 
(millisecond scale), embryonic cerebral development (weeks-to-
months scale), and clinically evident cerebrocortical degeneration 
(months-to-years scale, perhaps even decades), but few seem to 
have an appreciation of the far longer time frame that appears to 
be necessary for the entire process leading to most neuron-targeting 
degenerative disorders of the brain (decades to well beyond the life 
span in the feral condition of primates). To these temporal levels 
of resolution one would have to add the Biological Evolution time 
scale (millions of years), which is necessary to account completely 
for the processes that led to the existence of specific organisms 
and their specializations for cognition. This is in contrast with an 
entirely different category of acutely developing conditions that are 
two   substances produces, as is well known, a third substance with 
  properties different from those of either of the two substances sepa-
rately, or of both of them taken together…” 1843) and Julian Huxley 
(“…now and again there is a sudden rapid passage to a totally new 
and more comprehensive type of order or organization, with quite 
new emergent properties, and involving quite new methods for 
further evolution…” Huxley and Huxley, 1947). Lewes (1875) is 
most often credited with the first use of the term “emergent” in the 
sense most relevant to our discussion:
“…Every resultant is either a sum or a difference of the co-operant 
forces: their sum, when their directions are the same – their differ-
ence, when their directions are contrary. Further, every resultant is 
clearly traceable it its components, because these are homogeneous 
and commensurable. It is otherwise with emergents, when, instead 
of adding measurable motion to measurable motion, or things of 
one kind to other individuals of their kind, there is a co-operation 
of things of unlike kinds. The emergent is unlike its components 
insofar as these are incommensurable, and it cannot be reduced to 
their sum or their difference.”
The aim of this essay is not to eliminate the challenges of defining 
the term “cognition” more precisely, but to explore the obstacles to 
integrate the rapidly increasing amounts of experimental data on 
the presumed “machinery” for cognition in the normal and diseased 
human brain, to eventually achieve Purpura’s goal:
“What we require now are approaches that can unite basic neuro-
biology and behavioral sciences into a single operational network” 
(Purpura, 1975).
To do so, we use some of the information obtained in the 
process of attempting to understand Alzheimer’s disease and 
related neurodegenerative disorders, easily the most common 
“cause” of disordered cognition world-wide (Kuljiš, 2010) and 
thus potentially a valuable tool to understand the mechanisms 
that mediate it (Kuljiš, 2009a,b; Anderson and Kuljiš, 2008). 
This approach may serve as a model to better understand the 
challenges to integrate information obtained by practitioners of 
widely disparate disciplines, that have attempted to integrate the 
data for several decades with limited success. Important chal-
lenges include conceptual limitations that preclude the integra-
tion among practitioners of disciplines that focus on different 
components of the biological (and not merely neural) “machin-
ery” that presumably excels at generating emergent properties, 
including cognition (Kaneko, 1998). We focus especially on the 
challenge  of  developing  a  harmonious,  consistent,  and  truly 
useful understanding of the processes that mediate cognition 
while spanning the continuum of the subatomic (quantum; e.g., 
quantum brain hypotheses), molecular, cellular, cellular assem-
blies (e.g., the connectome), cognitive/behavioral and evolution-
ary levels. This perceived – but as yet unproven – continuum is 
arguably best highlighted by disorders that result in a disrupted 
“neural machinery,” but that cannot be explained adequately 
at present by integrating even large amounts of data from two, 
and even less so, more than two of these levels. This conundrum 
clearly points to the necessity for both new tools and, even more 
importantly, for a new conceptual framework in order to facilitate 
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Figure 1 | Sketch of some of the spatial (ordinate) and temporal 
(abscissa) scales demonstrated so far to be relevant to normal and 
altered cognition, and the role of selected experimental methods to 
address inevitably limited aspects of these levels of organization and 
function. Note the considerable extent of the gaps in the manifold that are 
not covered by the technology represented, which are considerable larger if 
we take into account the subatomic (no less than 10−10 m and 10−44 s) and the 
evolutionary (astronomical distances and millions of years) scales. MEG, 
magnetoencephalography; PET, positron emission tomography. Modified from 
Churchland and Sejnowski (1988).www.frontiersin.org  August 2010  | Volume 1  | Article 15  |  3
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selective fashion. This is not unique to AD, since, for example, in 
amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (which can be associated with demen-
tia), motor neurons are predominantly targeted although very spe-
cific local circuit cerebrocortical neurons seem to be affected as 
well (Kuljiš and Schelper, 1996). Likewise, in the heredodegenerative 
ataxias, selected cerebellar neurons are the main target (Butterworth, 
1992; Schols et al., 2004) and in Parkinson’s disease the dopamin-
ergic nigrostriatal projection neurons are targeted early in the dis-
ease process (Riederer and Wuketich, 2005) that very often leads 
to dementia as well. Perhaps the best example of this remarkable 
selectivity is AD, in which – despite the seemingly widespread distri-
bution of the lesions – even in the late stages of the disease specific 
neurons and neuronal assemblies appear to be selectively (and stere-
otypically) targeted whereas immediately adjacent ones are spared 
(Kuljiš, 1997, 2009a,b; Kuljiš and Tikoo, 1997).
In fact, in sporadic AD, quick and merely cursory inspection 
of most regions of the cerebral cortex appears to indicate a seem-
ingly extensive, random involvement. However, a slightly closer 
examination armed both with a familiarity with the microscopic 
anatomy of this region, and methodology to reveal aspects of its 
regional, areal, laminar, cellular, and supra-cellular assembly (a.k.a. 
modular) organization reveals that the involvement – although 
spread among many functionally different regions – is remarkably 
selective both in space and in time throughout the cerebral cortex 
(Kuljiš, 1994, 1997; Kuljiš and Tikoo, 1997). This region-, area-, 
layer- cell-, and cortical module component-selective targeting 
(Figures 2 and 3) defies to this day even the most highly imagina-
tive molecular hypotheses of the etiology and pathogenesis of the 
condition, since virtually all such approaches are forced to treat the 
brain as a “black box” (e.g., Figure 4) essentially ignoring even basic 
elements of its anatomical and functional organization that have 
been known in some instances since the 19th Century (Kuljiš, 1997, 
2009b). Thus, since they ignore key aspects of brain organization 
and function, strictly molecular explanations of neurodegenerative 
disorders may be condemned to remain incomplete (e.g., Fernández 
et al., 2008; Figure 4), but may succeed in a small number of cases 
– due to fortuitously useful oversimplification – in being applied 
to effective treatment and prevention (Kuljiš, 2009a, 2010).
the IrreducIbIlIty of systems-level AlterAtIons to 
moleculAr events (And vIce versA)
The focus at the molecular level of virtually all contemporary 
research on AD and related disorders has been very produc-
tive over the past three decades, and has led to many influential 
insights that fuel the search for improved treatments for these 
formerly untreatable conditions. While it is not the aim of this 
presentation to review such an extensive field, it is worth men-
tioning as examples the cholinergic hypothesis of AD (Francis 
et al., 1999), the amyloid hypothesis of AD (Hardy and Allsop, 
1991)  and  the  tau  hypothesis  of  AD  (Goedert  et  al.,  1991; 
Maccioni et al., 2009) to highlight the power of this approach. 
However, purely molecular/biochemical explanations of demen-
tia cannot possibly provide a complete and satisfactory biologi-
cal- and cognitive-level account of the conditions of interest, 
because the anatomical, histopathological and cognitive dimen-
sions (Figure 1) – among others – are irreducible to molecules 
and biochemistry. In fact, it is quite intriguing that while all of 
not neuron-selective, and result in the abrupt cessation of neuronal 
function (e.g., head injury and cerebrovascular insults). Even con-
ditions that appear to cause dementia invariably if the individual 
survives long enough (e.g., familial Alzheimer’s disease (AD) and 
severe cases of Down’s syndrome), the clinically evident manifesta-
tions usually appear only after several decades of life, although the 
“cause” (i.e., DNA mutations) exists since conception, and certainly 
during the histogenesis of the cerebral cortex. What are the fac-
tors responsible for the delay in clinical manifestations although 
the “cause” of the cognitive disorder is present since conception? 
Although this delay in the appearance of genetically caused dementia 
is often attributed to “aging,” this remains profoundly unsatisfactory 
because of the lack of an understanding of precisely what aging is, 
and exactly how does this poorly conceptualized phenomenon apply 
to the brain and to each of its myriad components that appear to be 
affected differently by the ill defined process of “aging.” Furthermore, 
the parameters responsible for the delay between the onset of the 
causative factor(s) and the clinical manifestations are even more 
elusive in the case of sporadic AD – since the cause(s) remain (or 
remains) unknown – but many postulate that the scale is in the 
realm of decades which is in contrast with the time span of the 
clinical disorder that usually runs its course in a few years or less 
than two decades (Anderson and Kuljiš, 2008). Thus, although most 
are accustomed to accept that there is a   considerable delay between 
the onset of the cause’s action and its ultimate clinical expression, 
few seem to consider precisely what may be the reasons for such a 
delay in the context of the millisecond-to-minutes scale of energy 
supply and biochemical/molecular renewal and function essential 
for the maintenance of the integrity and function of the cerebral 
cortex – and other   considerably shorter-scale phenomena – than 
the far longer time course of neurodegenerative disorders (Kuljiš, 
2009a). The mere mention of the fact that complete anoxia results 
in irreversible cessation of cortical function in a few minutes (Dugan 
and Kim-Han, 2006) seems to be in stark contrast with the much 
longer time scale for the “conventional” (and obviously incomplete) 
conceptualization for the pathogenesis of neuron-targeting neuro-
degenerative disorders (at least several decades) in the spectrum of 
AD-like conditions (Anderson and Kuljiš, 2008).
This has recently been made even more complicated by the rec-
ognition that the cerebral manifestations of sporadic AD – both 
macroscopic and microscopic, and perhaps also biochemical – are 
affected to a considerable extent by the age of the individuals mani-
festing the disorder (Savva et al., 2009). This does support our view 
that both the “normal” changes in the continuum of cognition both 
in the course of the normal life span, and, as a result of disease 
occurring at different stages in life, are best understood with a con-
ceptual framework that recognizes that “causes” may act differently 
at different stages of the life of the individual. We argue below that 
a wide array of physical (i.e., time–space) scales must be considered 
concurrently to understand this type of phenomena.
A broAd ArrAy of spAtIAl scAles relevAnt to the 
Assembly of the bIologIcAl substrAte for normAl 
And dIsordered cognItIon
Another rarely recognized conundrum is that, apart from the vast 
time scale required for the full course of neuron-targeting neurode-
generative disorders, these generally affect neurons in a remarkably Frontiers in Neurology  |  Dementia    August 2010  | Volume 1  | Article 15  |  4
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Figure 2 | Schematic diagram of the selective laminar distribution of senile 
plaques and neurofibrillary tangles in various regions of the cortex and the 
pulvinar nucleus of the thalamus, a structure highly interconnected with a 
vast array of so-called association cortices targeted heavily and early by 
sporadic Alzheimer’s disease (sAD). This view of the pathobiology of AD 
focuses on the circuitry affected and is limited to the resolution of the light 
microscopy. Thus, while it helps to understand the connections that are affected 
and to establish their correlation with the clinical manifestations of the disorder, it 
does not convey information about the ultrastructural, electrophysiological, 
functional imaging, and molecular domains, among others.
the above hypotheses of AD pathogenesis have their origin in 
anatomo-pathological observations (e.g., loss of neurons sub-
sequently found to be cholinergic, amyloid-containing senile 
plaques, and tau-containing neurofibrillary tangles), virtually 
all contemporary research motivated by such hypotheses is con-
ducted with increasing detachment from its anatomical under-
pinnings. There are aspects of this detachment that are highly 
desirable in fulfillment of a strong and rigorous “reductionist” 
approach, which has proven highly influential in contemporary 
Biology, including the Neurobiology of Disease. However, one so-
far unmitigated casualty of this approach has been an increasing 
disconnection from the actual human conditions that are mod-
eled by employing animals that only rarely replicate adequately 
actual human neurodegenerative conditions (Sarasa and Pesini, 
2009), or in deliberately (and, in fact, desirably) simplified assays 
in vitro that bear little resemblance to what may happen in the 
multi-dimensional manifold of the human brain that includes a 
much longer time span and spatial frame than those models. Yet 
the merits of such reductionistic approach will reach its fullest 
potential only when the insights gained are put back into the con-
text of a manifold, and thus integrated with the anatomical and 
physiological (e.g., cerebrocortical development and plasticity, 
specific neurotransmitter system networks, circuitry mediating 
functions that are selectively targeted versus those essentially 
spared) as well as the cognitive and behavioral levels (e.g., symp-
toms attributable to dysfunction at the molecular/biochemical 
or anatomical or physiological levels, or combinations thereof), 
among other dimensions. Needless to say, the conceptual frame-
work for such undertaking does not exist, and it is essential to 
begin formulating it. Thus the need for the space–time manifold 
approach, which is perhaps most evident when considering AD, 
given that the relative wealth of information available on this 
(these) condition(s) today fails to provide an obvious path for 
its complete understanding, especially when considering any of 
the levels of inquiry in isolation. This is a challenge not only 
because most experts in the field have been trained mainly in one 
of the relevant dimensions/levels of study, but mainly because the 
conceptual framework to address this challenge is – at best – in 
its infancy (Kuljiš, 2009a, 2010).
towArd A multI-dImensIonAl formulAtIon of the 
“emergent” propertIes thAt medIAte normAl And 
dIsordered cognItIon
Albeit vague notions of this integrative approach may be relatively 
common, yet hardly if ever voiced, an increasingly rigorous formu-
lation of the cerebral space–time manifold is necessary to begin to 
construct models of the histogenesis and the degeneration of the 
brain to apprehend and correlate the structural, temporal, bio-
chemical, behavioral and cognitive dimensions that continue to be 
studied in virtual isolation from one another. To the extent that the www.frontiersin.org  August 2010  | Volume 1  | Article 15  |  5
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for the understanding of many disorders, including degenerative 
disorders of the brain, and would likely propel substantial progress 
in their prevention, diagnosis, and treatment.
The  increasingly  atomized  nature  of  reductionist  research, 
while necessary and successful in elucidating considerable levels 
of molecular detail, is ill adapted to put these dramatic achieve-
ments into a Systems or Integrative level context. Other experts 
are relatively powerless to help molecular explorers from treating 
the brain disorders as a cognitive, behavioral, anatomical, and 
Systems-level “Black Box”. The manifold approach embraces the 
presumed interconnected, multi-dimensional nature of the struc-
tural, electrophysiological and biochemical/molecular domains, 
and time–space – among others – and helps to begin integrat-
ing these levels with a hopefully realistic expectation to develop 
a truly useful and innovative understanding of both normal and 
disordered brain function. This may permit us to eventually under-
stand how the “higher” integrative properties (and their disorders) 
emerge/result and even possibly interact with the other domains 
(e.g., molecular). This is essential to approach a truly mechanis-
tic understanding of normal and disordered cognition beyond 
the simplistic and definitely unsatisfactory notion that they are 
“emergent properties” of a rather mysterious “Black Box” (at one 
or another level) susceptible of breaking down, and that this can 
manifold remains insufficiently formulated, the vague correlations 
between “cause” and “effect” will continue to be elusive, especially 
in conditions such as sporadic AD since this clinico-pathological 
and biochemical construct appears to result not from a single 
“cause,” but from inadequately understood individual converging 
risk factors presumably ameliorated by a host of protective factors 
(Fernández et al., 2008; Figure 4). This defies conventional notions 
of causality, for which there is little in the way of an intellectual 
framework to allow a translation/conversion of concepts from one 
level of inquiry to another, and much less to integrate these coher-
ently and meaningfully between two domains. The situation is even 
more precarious for integration/correlation among many of the 
pertinent domains (Kuljiš, 2009a).
Precisely what is the manifold? The present hypothesis is part 
of an attempt to take into consideration the temporal and spa-
tial domains (from the microscopic to the macroscopic) together 
with  the  molecular/biochemical,  cellular,  systems,  behavioral 
and cognitive levels at which degenerative phenomena and their 
clinical manifestations occur, in order to integrate them into an 
improved explanatory continuum that is better able to account 
for the highly selective nature of many degenerative conditions in 
multiple domains. Such hypothetical integrative approach could 
have powerful implications not only for normal cognition, but also 
Figure 3 | A light microscopy-level representation of selective circuit 
targeting in sporadic Alzheimer’s disease. Our work in the primary visual 
cortex is based on the understanding of its modular organization in primates 
(summarized in the drawing on the left, from Kuljiš and Rakic, 1990). The 
hypercolumns that make this region contain iterated circuits in layers II/III 
that are disposed in “rows” along the tangential plane (i.e., parallel to the pial 
surface, shown in the left panel). Periodograms (right panel, labeled A–F) of 
the distribution of senile plaques in computer-assisted two-dimensional 
maps of layers II/III of the primary visual (striate) cortex in a patient with 
Alzheimer’s disease. The non-uniform distribution of the lesions is apparent 
with virtually all “windowing” parameters, from the highest (A) to the lowest 
(B) spatial resolutions. The row-like distribution of the lesions along the 
“tangential” domain (i.e., parallel to the pial surface and the white-gray 
matter interface) of the layers affected is strongly reminiscent of the eye 
dominance columns, and thus suggests that components of the 
“hypercolumns” that compose this region are affected, while immediately 
neighboring components remain unaffected even after the eventual demise 
of the patient years after the clinical onset of the disease. Modified from 
Kuljiš (1997 , 2009b) and Kuljiš and Tikoo (1997). Similar phenomena are 
known in the entorhinal–perirhinal interface, and may occur in less well 
understood cortices (Kuljiš, 2009b). The molecular/biochemical basis is 
unknown, as well as correlates at other levels.Frontiers in Neurology  |  Dementia    August 2010  | Volume 1  | Article 15  |  6
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Figure 4 | A mainly biochemical/molecular-level schematic representation 
of the hypothetical roles of endogenous “Danger/alarms Signals” that 
activate the innate immune System in the earliest stage of the pathogenesis 
of AD. A host of environmental/lifestyle-associated factors both “protective” (such 
as long-term exposure to cholinesterase inhibitors: ChEIs), as well as deleterious 
(a.k.a. “risk factors”) such as advancing age, combined with endogenous risk 
factors, trigger Danger Signals such as advanced glycation end products (AGES) 
resulting from diabetes mellitus, high mobility box group 1 (HMBG1), S-100 
proteins, and Aß peptide oligomers (but not β-pleated fibrillar aggregates) and/or 
tau protein oligomers, activate microglia through the AGES receptor (RAGE; 
shown here as a transmembrane protein in a cartoon of a lipid bilayer). Separately, 
oxidized low-density lipoproteins (oxLDL) activate toll-like receptors (TLRs), and, in 
particular, TLR4. Additional danger signals, such as trauma and oxyradical damage, 
possibly acting on separate receptors (black boxes inserted in the membrane) as 
well as by inducing the production of additional Aß peptide oligomers, AGES and 
S-100 protein could also contribute to this process. Separately and in various 
combinations (which would apply differentially to different individuals), these 
danger signals would trigger the Innate Immune System response to these alarm 
mechanisms, resulting in the production of tumor necrosis factor alpha (TNFα), 
interleukin 1-beta (IL1-ß), and interleukin-six (IL -6). These signals would then 
mediate neuronal damage directly, reflected in alterations such as tau protein 
hyperphosphorylation and paired helical filaments formation, which eventually 
result in neuronal degeneration, Aß peptide aggregation in a beta-pleated 
configuration, and progressively more severe clinical manifestations of cognitive 
and behavioral decline unrelated to amyloid aggregation. Modified from Fernández 
et al. (2008). In this view, converging risk factors (countered by “protective” 
factors) trigger alterations in the Innate Immune System that converge on RAGE, 
TLR, and possibly other receptors in the microglial membrane, which in turn 
trigger well-known events that lead to neuronal degeneration and clinically 
demonstrable manifestations in AD. While this predominantly molecular-level 
hypothetical explanation of AD pathogenesis is useful as a framework for the 
eventual development of “Personalized Medicine” approaches to dementia 
prevention and treatment, it does not account for the region-, area-, layer, circuit-, 
and neuron ensemble-specific aspects of AD shown by microscopic analysis 
(Figures 2 and 3), among many other known levels and scales of involvement 
(Figure 1). This challenge awaits experimental elucidation to begin to approach the 
multi-dimensional interpretation we advocate here towards an integrative – and 
presumably more powerful and far-reaching – understanding of dementia.www.frontiersin.org  August 2010  | Volume 1  | Article 15  |  7
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claim that the entire synaptic connectivity of a far more complex 
organism can be mapped in its entirety, and that such informa-
tion can be interpreted in a meaningful and useful way.
Quantum Brain (a.k.a. QM) hypotheses are relevant to this dis-
cussion because – if valid – would represent the smallest/lowest 
level that needs to be considered among the physical scales neces-
sary for an integrative understanding of brain function. However, 
QM hypotheses have been challenged both on the grounds of the 
impossibility of quantum coherence at body temperature (Tegmark, 
2000) – since this phenomenon necessitates temperatures very close 
to absolute zero (i.e., incompatible with life on Earth) – as well 
as on incisive criticism of its insufficiently articulated formulation 
(Bourget, 2004). In fact, Bourget has exposed numerous weakness 
in the hypothesis of Stapp, which render it untestable scientifically 
as well as implausible due to a lack of a firm correlation with brain 
mechanisms. Current defenders have been unable to overcome these 
fundamental objections, and tend to hold on to discredited or out-
dated concepts about brain oscillations attributed to mass action 
(Vitiello, 2009) and the thoroughly refuted and thus archaic concept 
of a lack of cerebral localization of function (Lashley, 1950). As a 
result, “Quantum theories of mind are routinely derided as having 
the explanatory power of ‘pixie in the synapses’” (Bourget, 2004, 
attributed to Rosenblaum and Kuttner, 1999) and are felt to repre-
sent the unsubstantiated, untenable, and even implausible opinion 
of a minority. In addition, QM hypotheses lack even a   minimal 
correlation with the considerably distinct regional architecture and 
function of the brain, and it is therefore not surprising that, in many 
cases, it continues to be held on the basis of mass action principles 
disconnected from the rest of the machinery of the brain (Vitiello, 
2009) that many feel – without compelling proof – is clearly not 
operating by quantum mechanical principles. In particular, the 
precise mechanisms by which the postulated quantum mechanical 
phenomena interact with specific brain regions to generate cogni-
tion, let alone “Free Will” and consciousness, have not been precisely 
defined, and, as a consequence, are not amenable yet to experi-
mental testing. This is relevant to our multi-dimensional formula-
tion in that the correlations of quantum and “subquantum” with 
mesoscale phenomena – all the way from molecules to cognition, 
behavior and emergent phenomena in communities of living beings, 
including human civilization, may be mediated by interactions or at 
least correlations among levels. However, interactions among these 
phenomena have not been formulated in a way that has ever been 
scientifically testable. However, although no existing QM hypothesis 
seems viable, taking Vedral’s (among others’) intriguing proposal 
that the universe is a giant quantum computer (Vedral, 2010) seri-
ously may eventually necessitate formulating cognitive phenomena 
in quantum mechanical terms again. This may prove the most pow-
erful argument to redevelop QM hypotheses, and thus necessarily 
extend the range of scales relevant to cognition to the subquantum 
level (not represented in Figure 1). Recent empirical observations 
support this possibility, such as the discovery that quantum effects 
(e.g., entanglement) can occur at “room temperature” and at even 
higher temperatures in inert materials (Ghosh et al., 2003; Vedral, 
2004), and that quantum effects can be observable macroscopically 
(Vedral, 2008). These genuine breakthroughs in experimental obser-
vation, plus strong indications that key phenomena in living organ-
isms such as photosynthesis can only be explained by invoking (albeit 
be completely, or at least sufficiently explained at the molecular/
biochemical level, or any other level in essential isolation from 
the others.
While it would seem that the multi-dimensional aspect of this 
hypothesis might be agreeable to most readers, the use of the 
terms “manifold” or “matrix,” among others, could be objection-
able and even misleading. This requires important clarifications: 
(a) these words are not used in their perhaps more common eso-
teric, supernatural, or literary/fictional sense (e.g., science fiction), 
(b) the term “matrix” in this presentation does not refer to previ-
ous formulations in Logic, Mathematics, Geometry, or Physics, 
and is unrelated to previous uses of this term and similar terms 
by Neuroscientists in the past, and (c) the latter class of unrelated 
terms includes the matrix formulations for language production 
(Goldrick et al., 2008), the highly influential two-dimensional 
formulations of Saaty (1977; as opposed to the present and criti-
cally multi-dimensional formulation), and the Holonomic brain 
theory (Pribram, 1987). Thus, the potentially provisional use of 
the words “matrix” and “manifold” in our formulation should be 
treated as devoid of prior intellectual or conceptual “baggage,” 
and, rather, understood as a temporary device to bind together 
different conceptual and methodological levels of understanding, 
that would otherwise remain disconnected. Unfortunately, a math-
ematical formulation is unlikely until the incomplete correlations 
between the gravitational and quantum mechanical descriptions 
of the   universe are   reconciled, including the so-called “decoupling” 
among length scales in physics. According to the latter principle, 
“physical phenomena of different length scales cannot affect each 
other and are said to decouple” (Wikipedia contributors, 2009) 
which constitutes only one among the many levels of the challenge 
towards understanding the phenomenon of Emergence.
ImplIcAtIons for QuAntum brAIn hypotheses  
And the connectome
The challenge of multiple scales/dimensions relevant to cog-
nition – in many cases spanning several orders of magnitude 
(Figure 1) – their apparent decoupling, and the hypothesized 
emergent phenomena (despite the contradiction posed by decou-
pling) applies critically also to two relatively new pursuits piv-
otal to the development of innovative inquiry in Neuroscience: 
(a) Quantum Brain (a.k.a. “Quantum Mind” or “QM” hypoth-
eses that postulate that quantum physics-level phenomena are 
fundamental not only for cognition, but also to ascertain the 
existence of Free Will (or lack thereof) and to explain it mecha-
nistically (Stapp, 1993; Vitiello, 2009), and (b) the proposal to 
pursue the Connectome Project – in a way akin to the Human 
Genome Project – to obtain a complete map of the connections 
of the human brain (Sporns et al., 2005, 2007; Livet et al., 2007; 
Lichtman et al., 2008; Bohland et al., 2009; Lu et al., 2009; Sporns, 
2009), which is mysteriously claimed to correlate with so-called 
“hubs” in the brain reportedly visualized by functional brain 
imaging technology (Hagmann, 2005; Wedeen et al., 2005, 2008; 
Murayama et al., 2006; He et al., 2007; Hagmann et al., 2007, 
2008; Sporns et al., 2007; Iturria-Medina et al., 2008; Izikevich 
and Edelman, 2008). The latter represents an unbridled exten-
sion beyond the reasonable “proof of principle” obtained some 
time ago in Caenorhabditis elegans (White et al., 1986), of the Frontiers in Neurology  |  Dementia    August 2010  | Volume 1  | Article 15  |  8
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already warned us – since it is a well established fact that merely 
mapping “nodes” in networks does not explain precisely how they 
work, and, furthermore, that only a few of the “nodes” (which are 
increasingly multiplying in specialty journals) are likely to convey 
and/or contain both important and relevant information (Barabasi 
and Bonabeau, 2003). The latter cannot be overemphasized, since, 
in virtue of the latter extraordinary principle, increasingly detailed 
maps may become increasingly less informative and actually dis-
tract precious focused attention away from the fundamental goal 
of elucidating the Connectome in a truly significant and inform-
ative way (e.g., with a higher resolution than “mesoscopically,” 
and guided by an as yet not existing framework for meaningful 
interpretation). In summary, before embarking in massive low-
resolution mapping towards the hoped-for Connectome, both 
a conceptual scheme to help make the results meaningful, and 
the deliberate design and selection of the methodology for this 
purpose is essential for this to become a truly useful enterprise. 
This challenge is not unique to the Connectome, since proteomic 
“maps” – among others – are now depicted in a way closely resem-
bling  the  low-resolution,  so-called “Connectome  maps”  (e.g., 
Hagmann et al., 2008). As a result, the problem of identifying 
the truly relevant “nodes” in the “network” and the likelihood of 
truly correlating the molecular (e.g., proteomic) and connectional   
(e.g., synaptic networks) domains may become more elusive rather 
than   feasible. This   challenge will be compounded further when 
studies of   alterations in the Connectome in   conditions such as 
AD are studied, a task that has not been approached yet at the 
cellular, subcellular, or any other level of resolution. Another 
formidable challenge to this task is exemplified by the field of 
Mesoscopic Physics (not to be confused with mesoscopic brain 
mapping), which is concerned with key problems such as the 
fact that the description of objects at the macroscopic level obey 
the laws of classical mechanics, whereas the mesoscopic descrip-
tions are appear in conflict with the laws of quantum mechanics 
(Wikipedia contributors, 2010). This illustrates powerfully the 
potentially greater challenges to address this type of conundrum 
in Neuroscience towards understanding cognition.
conclusIons
In this embryonic formulation, the proposed multi-dimensional 
“manifold” or “matrix” approach we posit may allow us to move 
on beyond little more than paying lip service to multi-disciplinary 
undertakings in Neuroscience that fail to accomplish most of the 
purported linking of disparate methodologies, and rarely allow 
a true conceptual integration in the so far equally hypothetical 
molecular (and perhaps even “subquantal”; Boyd and Klein, 2007; 
Vimal, 2008) through cognitive continuum. To move forward in 
this regard, we are as interested as most authors in the development 
of a sound foundation in physics for the concept of quantum com-
puting (Vedral, 2010), or an alternative but viable approach, and 
its application to Biology – and most especially Neuroscience – as 
well as in the resolution of the relatively recent (if incompletely 
formulated) challenge to the long-dominant concept that brains 
are information-processing systems (Noë, 2009).
To tackle the above unresolved conflicts, we propose that a 
manifold  model  of  dementia  (including Alzheimer’s  disease) 
“causation” and pathophysiology theoretically is applicable also 
poorly understood) quantum mechanical phenomena (Fleming and 
Scholes, 2004; Jang et al., 2004) suggest that it may be possible to 
conceive plausible QM hypotheses in the future. Therefore, this level 
of analysis cannot be excluded among the range of scales necessary to 
consider in order to develop an all-encompassing understanding of 
normal and disordered cognition. It is less than clear, however, how 
and whether this is a viable or even necessary goal, as the validity of 
Digital Physics remains in question since the original formulation 
by Zuse (1969) following up on the influential linking of informa-
tion theory, statistical thermodynamics and quantum mechanics by 
Edwin Jaynes (1957). The main tenet of this field is that the universe 
is describable as information and is therefore computable, and, thus 
variably held to be essentially information, digital, itself a colossal 
computer, or the output of a simulated reality exercise. This is a 
very intriguing and all-encompassing view that has been challenged 
compellingly (Floridi, 2009) and is therefore far from established, 
even in terms of plausibility. Therefore, its potentially far-reaching 
implications for our conceptualization of the physical basis of cogni-
tion, consciousness, and emergent phenomena relevant to normal 
and disordered neural function cannot yet be fully assessed.
The evolving concept of the Connectome is vaguely postulated 
on multiple scales (Kötter, 2007), that “…corresponding to the 
levels of spatial resolution…” (Sporns, 2009), and conceived as 
implemented as a static description of connections despite the 
well-established fact that two-photon imaging in vivo reveals the 
rapid appearance and disappearance of key substrates for con-
nectivity such as dendritic spines (Bonhoefer and Yuste, 2002). 
This difficulty is compounded by the rapidly increasing number of 
imaging studies in vivo, that purport to reveal functional “networks” 
and “nodes” at very low resolution (Hagmann et al., 2005, 2007, 
2008), i.e., several orders of magnitude lower than indispensable to 
resolve dendritic spines, or any type of synapse. Unfortunately, the 
technology to accomplish the latter in vivo, especially in humans, 
does not exist. Furthermore, the conceptual framework to convert 
such low-resolution maps to higher-resolution ones capable of 
translating these vague “nodes” and “networks” into synaptic or 
at least individual neuronal function does not exist either. There 
is also no paradigm to interpret the resulting connectivity maps 
in a way that will help understand the mechanisms of normal 
and disordered cognition. Therefore, it is unclear precisely what 
is being accomplished by increasingly lower resolution “map-
ping” that ignores most of what has been learned about cerebral 
circuitry employing light- and electron microscopy in the past 
four decades. This situation obviously calls for a true conceptual 
framework and matching methodology to ensure that this essen-
tial integration and cross-correlation among substantially differ-
ent levels of magnitude is meaningful. In this regard, the recent 
proposal to map “…brainwide neuroanatomical connectivity…
at the mesoscopic scale…” (Bohland et al., 2009) while laudable 
in general principle, is probably very far from achieving the goal 
we propose here, given the low resolution inherent to mesoscopic 
projects, and, above all, due to the lack of a conceptual framework 
to move on beyond the mesoscopic level even if current method-
ology would allow so. This is relevant in terms of elucidating the 
connection between, at least, the molecular through the cognitive 
and behavioral domains. Otherwise, there is a considerable risk 
of creating a New Phrenology – as Noë (2009) among others have www.frontiersin.org  August 2010  | Volume 1  | Article 15  |  9
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